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Resisting Globalization: Voting Power
Indices and the National Interest in
EU Decision Making
Elisabetta Croci Angelini
14.1 Introduction
The European integration process can be regarded as just one aspect of the
overall process of globalization and at the same time as an attempt to recon-
cile the move towards standardization with the defence of national diversity.
Although it has been given several meanings and so eludes a precise defi-
nition, globalization is commonly understood as a trend towards a higher
homogeneity across countries spanning from the most obvious results of
trade liberalization (that is, the dominance of the law of a single price for
goods as well as the ultimate factor-price equalization) to financial integra-
tion to impressive labour mobility. The major negative spillover highlighted
in the literature consists in increasing income inequality both within and
across countries, a possible shrinking of the welfare state as an effect of
tax competition and the primacy of a common standard which is feared to
reduce quality (Baumol and Batey-Blackman, 1991) and extinguish national
varieties.
As long as European economic integration is considered a globalization
exercise, worries about national identities eventually fading out are evoked
every time a move towards more integration is on sight. Conversely, lower
levels of economic integration (for example, the free movements of goods
only) are perceived to interfere with national identity to a lesser extent and so
recommended by the Eurosceptic view. The existence of these latter concerns
is testified by the emphasis dispensed by the governments of EuropeanUnion
(EU) member states in reassuring European citizens about their commitment
towards preserving national identities and is symbolically reflected by the
European Union’s motto ‘Unity in diversity’.
Yet European economic integration is a globalization of a very special
kind. The EU institutional arrangements, with common institutions set
at the supranational level, provide a strong argument to those claiming
that European integration is different from globalization. The EU collec-
tive decision-making process – whereby Commission proposals are processed
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through the interaction of Council of Ministers and Parliament preferences
and finally adopted – plays a central role in the member states’ effort to
reap the benefits of integration while keeping the national interest alive. The
way collective decision-making rules work renders European economic inte-
gration a regulated globalization undertaking where national representatives
struggle for the conquest of the ‘lion’s share’ in the division of the surplus
stemming from the compromise on common policies.
This chapter examines how the member states of the European Union seek
to reorient governability at the European Union level against a context of
globalization in which it often seems that member state governments are los-
ing control over their economies and the capacity tomake policy choices. The
next section introduces EU institutional architecture. Following this, section
14.3 provides an overview of alternative appraisals of EU integration, either
as a hindrance to national autonomy or as a shield against globalizationwith-
ering the power of nation-states. Section 14.4 analyses the balance of power
across national governments in decisions by the EU Council. Finally, section
14.5 discusses the problems involved in the assessment of the distribution of
power across countries.
14.2 The evolutionary nature of European integration
During the five decades since their creation, the common institutions have
grown to be essential players in increasing numbers of spheres of influence.
The European Community, starting from agriculture and international trade,
has expanded its domain to embrace competition, regulation, and recently
money, while issues contained in the second and third pillar of the European
Union – Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and respectively Jus-
tice and Home Affairs, lately re-named ‘Police and Judicial Co-operation in
Criminal Matters (PJCC)’ – are under discussion and might be added in the
future. Indeed, some matters initially covered by the third pillar, such as
asylum, immigration and visas, have already been transferred to the first:
the European Community. As more policy spheres were added, more room
for manoeuvre to achieve complex compromises has been made available to
member states, a circumstance favouring the engineering of nested games –
that is, meta-games composed by connected sub-games over issues involv-
ing a plurality of stakeholders (Tsebelis, 1991). For instance, the Nice Treaty
amending Amsterdam Treaty can be understood in terms of linkages across
games (Croci Angelini, 2005). The evolutionary nature of European integra-
tion is also a reason why it is perceived as a continuously growing process
rather than an unfinished accomplishment or an unachieved objective. The
perception of an ever evolving state of affairs which reflects a organization
still in flux, yet which usually favours the status quo, implicitly renders the
reversal of the process unlikely, and also constrains the possibility of moving
ahead (Salmon, 2004).
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The EU institutional architecture is based on the sharing of power between
member states’ governments and supranational bodies which results in a
multi-level governance. The subsidiarity principle, introduced by the Maas-
tricht Treaty in the acquis communautaire, establishes that EU action must
be limited to sectors where member states alone are unable to achieve what
they could achieve together bymeans of common institutions and so seeks to
devise an efficient allocation of tasks and consequently of power. The optimal
allocation of tasks and competences between central and local institution is
regarded as a basic character of federal systems. Yet, although the multi-tier
European governance displays some elements in common with federalism,
the evolution of the EU has not progressed towards anything that could be
called a European government, e.g. by fostering the Commission power and
role (Warleigh, 2002). In the course of the years the supranational ambi-
tion, embodied in the EC pillar and in the communitarian method, has been
confronted by the intergovernmental practice, where the national views and
interests are put forward. The European Parliament has managed to consider-
ably increase its role and responsibilities: the early consultation procedure has
been followed at first by the cooperation and later by the co-decision proce-
dure which currently applies to the highest proportion of common decisions.
Still, the EU intergovernmental essence has not at all subsided: the most
important issues are regularly discussed by the European Council, an insti-
tution that has been incorporated into the original architecture and where
nowadays the way ahead is planned. The constitutional changes introduced
so far have mainly focussed in calibrating the equilibrium of power between
the Council and the Parliament.
It is well known that the origin of the present EU institutional architecture
was conceived in the political atmosphere of the aftermath of the Second
World War. It is equally well known that the hope the EEC would eventually
develop into an economic success was regarded as a very important means
towards an even more important political end. The postwar international
economic order based upon such agreements as Bretton Woods, the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) offered a shield guaranteeing the European experiment. However,
the EU’s subsequent developments, perhaps with the partial exception of
the most recent enlargements, have almost entirely been a consequence of
the economic realm, and, in particular, of markets integration. Nowadays,
one could even interpret the evolution suggesting that the means and ends
hierarchy has been overturned and politics replaced by economics. The criti-
cism that the EU is an economic giant but a political dwarf and the appeal to
fill the democratic gap and foster integration in the political sphere is often
put forward by emphasizing that it would enable a better functioning of
European integration in the economic area. National governments also rely
upon the superior democratic legitimacy of their power vis-à-vis EU institu-
tions. For instance, ‘the German Constitutional Court argued that the EU
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lacks a comparable democratic legitimacy to the principle of democracy as it
is fixed in the German constitution’ (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2003). Several
scholars have proposed the introduction of elements of direct democracy in
EU decision-making in order to reduce the democratic deficit in the EU and
to create a European demos (Habermas, 2001).
14.3 National interests and integration
Notwithstanding the significantly increased responsibility of the European
Parliament, the crucial common decisions reside largely in the hands of
national governments. Yet no national government alone is able to con-
trol common decisions. The member states’ power materializes in reaching
common decisions – that is, it becomes apparent in the ability to reach a
favourable compromise within the Intergovernmental Conferences where
constitutional innovations are introduced and, more often, within the Coun-
cil of the EU where ordinary decisions in the shared areas of competence are
taken. The Council then interacts with the Parliament and alsowith the other
EU institutions which are able to exert influence.
Although national governments may sometimes be impatient of the con-
straints imposed by Brussels to their autonomy, they should be equally aware
of the inadequacy of the tools available to them in facing the challenges of
globalization: the European governance could provide them with a chance
to tame globalization. The question therefore is whether European integra-
tion has ultimately turned out to be a necessary remedy to preserve national
sovereignty at least to some extent, rather than a hindrance to the full expres-
sion of an autonomous decision-making activity by national governments.
Some even think that EU integration is an opportunity. The answer to how
big a loss of national sovereignty is desirable or inevitable for a given coun-
try is far from trivial and lies at the heart of integration theory. Since a
growing international interdependence translates into a considerable loss of
self-determination, the exercise of policy co-ordination, harmonization, and
even unification due to EUmembership is increasingly perceived as a manda-
tory option (Nugent, 1999). The paradoxical by-product of transfer of power
to Brussels is that – despite the EU is considered a sheer subset of the uni-
fied world market – the power of each country is stronger within rather than
without it.
Since common policies are implemented by national governments, while
common institutions supervise andmonitor their execution, the EUdecision-
making system has been interpreted by Putnam (1988) as a two-level game:
national governments define their stance first at the national level and
subsequently bargain at the intergovernmental level within the common
institutions. The players of the game – national governments – retain the
control of the speed and direction of the integration process and are aware
that the scope of their membership is to take advantage of the cooperation
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in order to pursue some specific goals. The evolutionary nature of the EU
is therefore attributed to the need of a continuous reorganization meant to
allow them keeping a substantial part of power.
Game theory has produced a huge literature with the intention of under-
standing, explaining and forecasting the interaction both among the EU
institutions and between these and the EU member states. The EU decision-
making system embraces the relationships among all institutions that take
part in decision making. It encompasses both cooperative games and non-
cooperative games. The former require coalition formation to reach the
number of votes needed to adopt a legislative act, whereas the latter non-
cooperative games are played when conflicting interests have to be settled.
The many phases and the various aspects of the EU games have been
examined by addressing such issues as its structure – the voting proce-
dures and the distribution of voting power – the actors’ behaviour – how
preferences are formed, expressed and aggregated – as well as the ‘content
of democratic representation’ it purports – that is, how truthfully citi-
zens’ preferences are conveyed and respected by the overall decision-making
process.
While in the early years of the European Community decisions were de
facto taken by unanimity in theCouncil ofMinisters and the European Parlia-
ment had a consultative role only, since the adoption of the Single European
Act (SEA) in 1986 a clear shift towards a more intense recourse to qualified
majority rule and a more relevant role of the Parliament has been endorsed.
First, the cooperation procedure, and later the co-decision procedure pre-
scribe qualified majority voting in the EU Council. Coalition formation has
therefore become increasingly important both because the increased number
of occurrences provides the players with valuable opportunities to observe
other players’ behaviour, establish alliances and build up reputations, and
because, no matter how seldom minister vote in the Council, a change in
the prospect of the game and in the strategy of the players took place owing
to the very fact that the recourse to an explicit vote might be requested and
obtained.
In theCouncil of the EUdecisionsmay be taken by voting either under una-
nimity or under qualifiedmajority rule, according to the procedure associated
to the policy area of the issue at stake. It is understood that the vote in the
Council of Ministers reflects the country’s interest: each minister is assigned
a single vote weighted by the size of the country in terms of population in
order to reflect the ‘one man one vote’ principle in an indirect voting rule
whereby citizens’ preferences are represented by their governments, rather
than being expressed by a direct vote. In a two-tier indirect voting process
voters elect their representatives who actually vote over issues. Under quali-
fied majority voting, the voting system needs solve the problem of how the
distribution of weights across countries should reflect the size of the member
states’ population.
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14.4 National interests and voting power
In the EU Council, voting power is determined in two distinct steps: (1)
Countries are attributed a number of votes on the basis of their resident pop-
ulation. This corresponds to considering each country a coalition collecting
all its citizens. In order to guarantee all citizens the same voting power irre-
spective of the country they belong to, a country bigger in terms of voters
should havemore voting power than a less populated country. (2) Countries –
the ministers in the Council – form coalitions so to achieve a common goal.
A particular aspect of the democratic deficit is therefore that a whole country
may be outvoted, if it does not participate in the winning coalition.
Since a winning coalition can endorse a proposal without the votes of
the remaining voters, the voting system needs to obey a horizontal equity
criterion assigning each voter equal voting power. This criterion is always
warranted by the unanimity rule, which corresponds to a single winning
coalition and consequently implies the same voting power for each voter.
Under a system of qualified majority voting with weighted votes, a correct
representation of the citizens’ preferences needs the formulation of a more
sophisticated voting system. In a two-tier voting system a fair distribution of
voting power was demonstrated to result by assigning to each nation aweight
‘proportional to the square root of the number of people on each nation’s vot-
ing list’ (Penrose, 1946). Nevertheless, two problems are strictly interwoven:
(1) establishing a ‘fair’ distribution of weights among countries/voters, such
as to reflect the a priori ‘weight’ of the coalition they represent; (2) the coali-
tion formation among the countries. Since the voting power depends upon
the size of the coalition, to be ‘fair’ the distribution ofweights across the coun-
tries (problem 1) should reflect the probability that permanent coalitions
form among countries (problem 2). The EU institutional setting considers
countries as permanent citizens’ coalitions and distributes weights on the
basis of this element exogenously given, while all possible coalitions of mem-
ber states towards passing or blocking a piece of legislation are attributed the
same ex ante probability.
Both issues are less than obvious: (1) the national interest is more easily
found in a very homogeneous country than in a divided country, where the
opposition collects nearly as many votes as the government; (2) undoubtedly
not all countries’ coalitions are equally likely: a weight distribution may well
reflect a ‘fair’ a priori voting power under a veil of ignorance over issues to
be voted in the future and nevertheless turn out to be ‘unfair’ a posteriori if
permanent coalitions of member states are formed over the issues actually
put on the floor.
For example, suppose a decision has to be taken by majority voting by
three countries, A, B and C, with populations of 4, 9 and 16, respectively.
On the basis of the square root rule suggested by Penrose, country A (popula-
tion 4) is assigned 2 votes, country B (population 9) gets 3 votes and country
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C (population 16) obtains 4 votes. As in terms of population country C is big-
ger than the sum of country A plus country B, one would expect that under
majority voting it would never be outvoted. Yet, if country A and country
B form a permanent coalition, the sum of their votes (5=2+3) does not
correspond to their total population of 13. On the basis of the square root
principle, 5 votes correspond to a population of 25, while a single population
of 13 should obtain only 3.6 votes.
This simple example demonstrates that permanent coalitions manage to
havemore voting power than each participant country standing alone would
be able to have. The ‘fair’ a priori distribution of votes is no longer ‘fair’ a
posteriori if permanent coalitions are formed. Although it is obviously unre-
alistic, under a veil of ignorance equiprobability is assumed to apply to all
coalitions and weights are distributed accordingly. Yet taking into account
the actual preferences of the member states, and evaluating the likelihood
of any given coalition, poses such problems that a preference-based power
index has been claimed to be impossible (Braham and Holler, 2005). Interest-
ingly, new empirical evidence now available may indicate that this problem
is actually less important than one would guess.
Information on individual Council sessions for the years 1998–2004 have
been collected in a database featuring 564 ‘roll-call’ observations and 8,460
individual expressions of votes by member states (Hayes-Renshaw, van Aken,
Wallace, 2006). Frequently, contesting states are both critical and integra-
tionists, both with old and new membership and, surprisingly, often voting
on their own. No evidence of persistent pattern of alliances emerges from
the sample, which is admittedly, and unfortunately, underreported. In the
absence of information about voter preferences as well as about the issues that
should be discussed and voted on in the future the only working hypothe-
sis one may advocate is the equiprobability of all coalitions (that is, every
coalition has the same probability of being picked up). The ensuing distri-
bution of weights, under a veil of ignorance, is deemed to be ‘fair’ according
to this criterion, although in the real world equiprobability is hardly found
and ‘the vast majority of the millions of theoretically conceivable coalitions
are highly unlikely’ (Moberg, 2002, p. 261). Yet it is worth noticing that the
absence of regularity in the pattern of alliances does not amount to claiming
that the over 130 million theoretically possible coalitions for the EU-27 are
equally likely.
14.5 The probabilistic nature of voting power indices
The distribution of power for each voter within an assembly is expressed
by voting power indices. The voting power descends from: 1. the number
of voters, 2. the distribution of weights, and 3. the quota. Voting power is
analysed by means of cooperative games, where players aim at setting up
winning coalitions to have their proposal adopted. A coalition is any subset
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of voters. Under relativemajority rule the complement of a winning coalition
is always a losing coalition. Yet a losing coalition may still have enough votes
to stop a proposal it opposes (blocking coalition) under such rules as weighted
voting and qualified majority voting. A priori voting power indices – such as
the classical Penrose, Banzhaf, Holler, and Shapley–Shubik indices – are based
on probabilistic analysis of individual voters in a coalition voting system, and
calculate the opportunity for individual voters to change the outcome of the
vote from rejection to adoption by casting their votes (swing). When votes
are unevenly distributed – for example, under a system of weighted voting –
some voters may have no opportunity of casting swing votes and so their
vote turn out to be irrelevant (dummy). For simplicity it is assumed that all
voters express a vote by saying either yes or no, so that each time a vote is
convened two coalitions only form: a winning one and a losing one.
Penrose (1946) and Banzhaf (1965) indices are based upon the probability
that a given voter takes part into a winning coalition. To assess the voting
power of each player one needs to know the total number of winning coali-
tions and the number of coalitions where a particular player is decisive – that
is, she may turn a winning into a losing coalition by changing her vote from
yes to no (swing).1 The Banzhaf index of power reflects the share of the voter
swing votes over total swing votes.2 By listing all winning coalitions and
counting the swing voters, it looks at the probability of individuals chang-
ing the decision of their coalition and the probability that the coalition is
successful.
The Shapley–Shubik (1954) index is centred on the probability of being a
pivotal voter.3 The coalition is understood as the outcome of an agreement
among some voters so to make the issue succeed. The central concept is
decisiveness and the index for each voter calculates the frequency of casting
the votes that turns a losing into a winning coalition. Voter i is pivotal when
by casting his vote he is critical in changing the outcome of the vote. It is
base on the number of possible permutations, all equally likely, in addition
to all coalitions as in Banzhaf-Penrose.
The Holler (1982) index (PGI ) is based on minimum winning coalitions –
that is, coalitions that do not include any other winning coalition as a subset.
The emphasis is on the bargaining process before the coalition is formed and
the vote is expressed. Extra votes (that is, votes exceeding the minimum
requirement to pass the issue) are not welcome: the extra voters will claim
their share in a prize they did not contribute to gain.
The calculation of voting power for a given voter requires the entire distri-
bution of weighted votes and the threshold of votes (quota) needed to secure
the passage of the bill, in order to be able to assign each coalition either to the
winning, or to the losing group and, on this basis, to evaluate the probability
of each voter being included in a winning coalition. However, there is more
than one way to calculate voting power, corresponding to different concepts.
The traditional measures of a priori voting power are based on the probability
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of taking part into a winning coalition. The Banzhaf–Penrose index implies
that coalitions are formed by chance, or, in other words, are drawn randomly
from the ballot box. The Shapley–Shubik index visualizes voters lining up in
a queue to express their preference until the threshold (quota) of the required
majority is reached. The different concepts behind these a priori voting power
indices are also referred to as addressing I-power (influence) and P-power
(payoff/prize), respectively. In the case of I-power, a voter is decisive when
they can turn a winning into a losing coalition by changing their vote from
yes to no (swing). A voter’s power reflects the share of their swing votes over
total swing votes. It amounts to the probability of individual voters being
able to change the decision of their coalition and the probability that the
coalition is successful. Influence (I-power) refers to the power to have one’s
proposal adopted: large majorities are preferred and applies to decisions over
policies, when sharing is not a problem. In the case of P-power, the coalition
is understood as the outcome of an agreement among some voters to have
their preferences prevail. The process of coalition formation stems from bar-
gaining and power is assigned to the voter that succeeds in changing a losing
into a winning coalition. This is why both the coalition composition and its
ordering are relevant to compute the Shapley–Shubik index. Prize (P-power)
power refers to the capability of getting a payoff: minimal majorities are pre-
ferred as it pertains to decisions over a something limited – such as taking
office or sharing a budget.
When choosing a voting power measure, therefore, one should be con-
cerned about the reason why a measure of voting power is called for. The two
measures of voting power may or may not agree in assigning to the mem-
ber states their voting power. One index, unsuitable for one aspect of voting
power, may be eligible for another (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998). How-
ever, although I-power and P-power reflect conceptually distinct measures –
for instance, the first for policies, the second for the budget – they still
conflate so long as policies compete for being financed by the budget.
Traditionally, the requirement of a decision-making rule being ‘fair’ has
been understood as reflecting the ‘one man, one vote’ principle or ‘giving
the preferences of each voter the same chance of being represented’. How-
ever, it has been shown that the fairness of distribution depends upon the
nature of the assembly as well as the hypothesis about the actual behaviour of
voters. ‘If the EUwere a single state, all citizens should be treated equally. The
‘One man, one vote’ principle should apply directly to them. If the EU were
an association of states, no state should be treated differently from another.
Thus, the ‘One state, one vote’ should be applied’ (Laruelle and Widgren,
1998, p. 321). As the EU is neither a single state, nor regards itself as a sim-
ple association of states, this equity criterion is difficult to fulfil. So, should
EU member states dispose of the system of weighted voting? Proposals have
been advanced to let the Council vote on the basis of number of states and
population represented. Although seeking unanimity is always required, a
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condition rendering the Penrose–Banzhaf index the most relevant measure
of voting power in the EU decision-making process, when qualified major-
ity voting is unavoidable, a proposal is adopted by the Council if it satisfies
different criteria. The most recent rules are those stipulated in the Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was adopted in June 2004,
but has not been ratified. At the time of writing it is being renegotiated but
it is unclear if the voting rules will be changed. These criteria are: (1) it is
supported by at least 13 countries, the simple majority of states for EU-25;
and (2) the countries supporting it must represent at least 60 per cent of
the EU population. The European Council held in Brussels in June 2004 has
changed the proposed criteria and decided that, unless at least 22 member
states endorse the measure, a proposal is endorsed if: (1) it is supported at
least by 15 countries; and (2) the countries supporting it represent at least
65 per cent of the population of the EU (Laruelle, Martinez and Valenciano,
2006).
However, the change does not get rid of the problem, since each criterion
of the ‘double majority’ may be subject to previous drawbacks: ‘a majority of
states’ brings back the intergovernmental concept of the EU as a states’ assem-
bly, while in indirect voting ‘a qualified majority of population’ undergoes
similar drawbacks as weighted voting.
14.6 Concluding remarks
The present state of the art of EU integration is that national governments
interact at the EU supranational level in order to exploit the participation in
cooperative and non-cooperative games andmake themost out of themutual
advantage of being shielded vis-à-vis globalization. The EU Council decision-
making process reflects this strategic setting. Although not all coalitions of
countries are equally likely, on the empirical grounds it is not easy to find
out what is the best strategy for a member state government to get the lion’s
share from participating in a coalition. Various voting power indices have
been elaborated by the literature, all of them suffering from the equiproba-
bility drawback. In addition, one index, unsuitable for one aspect of voting
power, may be eligible for another. Concepts of power differ and so does the
implicit fairness for each index, which depends upon weights distribution.
As each voting power index reflects a difference concept of voting power and
the advantaged position of each country depends upon the issues at stake,
one country may be favoured by one index rather than another. However,
although in principle one may associate the right index to the relevant issue
(for example, the Penrose–Banzhaf to policies and the Shapley–Shubik to
the budget) the two realms conflate as policies are financed by the budget.
Given the impasse of the EU constitutional process, the present EU qualified
majority voting rule relies on a mixture of criteria based on the distribution
of weights, the number of member states and even a population share. The
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formation of coalitions could be decided according to long-term structural
affinities such as cultural ‘homogeneity’ (such as the Mediterraneans, the
Scandinavians, the Eurosceptics, and so on) or on economic grounds (the per
capita income distance between the newCentral and Eastern Europemember
states vis-à-vis the richer EU-15 countries).
Notes
1. Penrose power index (π) for voter i where i∈N and N ={1, 2, ...n} is given by ratio
of the voter swings (ηi) to the total coalitions she takes part to (2n−1). The share
of swings over all possible coalitions for each voter is also called absolute Banzhaf
index: πi(v)= ηi2n−1
2. Banzhaf power index (β) for voter i where i∈N and N ={1, 2, ...n} is given by ratio
of the voter swings (ηi) to the total number of swings for thewhole setN of n voters,
whether or not voter i participates into the winning coalition: βi(v)= ηiηi =
πi
πi
3. Shapley–Shubik index () for voter i where i∈N and N ={1, 2, ...n} is given by the
ratio between the number of orderings where the voter is pivotal and the total
number of orderings for all voters. In a population of n voters, the index adds the
probability of being pivotal in any coalition of s voters: i(v)= ∑ (|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!n! .
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